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[Jakarta, 28 January 2025]&nbsp;The November 2024 regional executive elections in Papua, Highland Papua, and Central Papua were marred by violence and allegations of fraud, with the noken system of proxy voting at the heart of the controversy. The report rejects the Indonesian government&rsquo;s conclusion that the problem can be solved by ending direct elections and suggests instead that more resources be poured into cleaning up voter rolls, allocating more resources for voter education and poll monitoring, ensuring better election supervision and punishing fraud.
<a title="Indonesia: Election Credibility in Papua Requires Ending &quot;Noken&quot;" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/%28IPAC_Report_100%29-Indonesia-Election-Credibility-in-Papua-Requires-Ending-Noken.pdf.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">"Indonesia: Election Credibility in Papua Requires Ending &lsquo;Noken&rsquo;&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), reveals widespread electoral irregularities in Papua&rsquo;s three most populous provinces. The elections delivered surprising victories for &ldquo;dark horse&rdquo; candidates, but the results remain contested. All defeated candidates for governor have filed petitions to the Constitutional Court, seeking to overturn the results and disqualify the winners. 
&ldquo;The use of noken &ndash; a vaguely defined proxy voting practice where community leaders vote on behalf of constituents &ndash; is the biggest problem because it routinely produces 100 per cent turnouts &ndash; or higher &ndash; and improbable margins of victory and defeat,&rdquo; says Deka Anwar, IPAC analyst. Jakarta&rsquo;s Constitutional Court, and many Papuan politicians, claim that letting an influential local leader vote on behalf of his village, neighborhood, or clan is a traditional practice in Papua, but in fact, it is a pretext for avoiding doing the kind of work necessary to ensure a semblance of democracy there.
Scrutiny of the election results show manipulation by candidates, administrators and supervisors at all levels. If dark horse candidates won, it does not necessarily mean that they were more popular or mounted more effective campaigns. Too often it means more strategic use of noken, combined with money politics.
IPAC argues that Jakarta&rsquo;s continued acceptance of noken voting, and its indifference toward the fraud it engenders, reflects a pattern of treating Papua as a region where lower standards can be applied and political rights can be flouted with impunity. It urges the Indonesian government to take the first step toward credible elections in Papua by ending noken voting.

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The November 2024 regional executive elections in Papua, Highland Papua, and Central Papua were marred by violence and allegations of fraud, with the noken system of proxy voting at the heart of the controversy. 

Indonesia: Election Credibility in Papua Requires Ending "Noken"

[Jakarta, 15 November 2024] Indonesian voters will go to the polls on 27 November to choose their provincial governors and district heads, and nowhere is likely be more tense than Papua. Indonesia&rsquo;s easternmost region was carved up into six provinces in 2022, and four of them will be choosing local executives for the first time. Local elections in Papua are often problematic because of difficulties with logistics, corruption, lack of witnesses, ethnic rivalries, and in some cases, disruption by insurgents. It may be worse than usual this time round, especially with election administration in the new provinces &ndash; which means election observers from civil society are desperately needed.
<a title="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-98-Potential-Fraud-and-Violence-in-Papuas-Approaching-Elections" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/2024-11-14Final-FrmtPotential-Fraud-and-Violence-in-Papuas-Approaching-Elections-eng.pdf.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&ldquo;Potential Fraud and Violence in Papua&rsquo;s Approaching Elections&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), takes a close look at the governors&rsquo; races in three provinces: Papua, Central Papua and Highland Papua. The latter two are among the new provinces; they also happen to be the areas where pro-independence guerrillas are most active.
&ldquo;Contrary to popular belief, the biggest problem in these elections isn&rsquo;t going to come from the insurgents or the military &ndash; it&rsquo;s going to come from individuals trying to rig the vote to get more spoils for themselves and their backers,&rdquo; says Deka Anwar, IPAC analyst.&nbsp;
One official from Papua province was caught on audio record last month outlining how money would be distributed to ensure that his candidate, the former police chief of Papua, would win.&nbsp;
The report notes that the General Election Commissions (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) at the national and provincial levels have tried to address some of the flaws of the past by a variety of measures, including by scanning vote-tallying forms with a smart phone app to try and ensure against discrepancies. But some of their solutions may actually make matters worse, for example, by reducing the number of polling stations.
&ldquo;The 2022 division of Papua hasn&rsquo;t made elections any easier,&rdquo; says Anwar. &ldquo;But the answer is not to go back to the indirect elections of the New Order, as some have suggested. For these elections, coming up in two weeks, independent observers may be the best answer. For the future, to really fix the system, it&rsquo;s a question of resources, voter education, and political will in Jakarta.&rdquo;
&nbsp;

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Indonesian voters will go to the polls on 27 November to choose their provincial governors and district heads, and nowhere is likely be more tense than Papua.

Potential Fraud and Violence in Papua’s Approaching Elections

[Jakarta, 8 August 2024] President Marcos and his advisers should stay neutral on the coming 2025 parliamentary elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The recommendation comes as some in the president&rsquo;s inner circle are suggesting that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) needs another three years in power &ndash; one more election cycle to consolidate the peace.
<a title="Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-97-Philippines-Avoiding-a-Zero-Sum-Game-in-the-2025-BARMM-Elections-pdt.pdf.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&ldquo;Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in Jakarta and the third in a series on the elections, looks at increasing violence as two large parties and many small ones compete to win seats in the Bangsamoro Parliament and secure the all-important position of Chief Minister in May 2025. The main contest will be the MILF&rsquo;s United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) and an alliance of traditional clan leaders known as the Bangsamoro Grand Coalition (BGC).
&ldquo;The idea that peace depends on the MILF staying in power is flawed,&rdquo; says Sidney Jones, IPAC&rsquo;s senior adviser. &ldquo;If it&rsquo;s not clear that the BGC will do any better, it&rsquo;s also not clear that they will do any worse.&rdquo; A BCG victory would, however, end the hope that BARMM, with its unprecedented experiment in parliamentary democracy, could fundamentally change the political culture of the region.
IPAC notes that there is no guarantee that the unfinished business of the peace process in BARMM, especially the final round of decommissioning of MILF combatants, will be any closer to completion by 2028, mainly because the armed combatants constitute the MILF&rsquo;s strongest bargaining chip. No progress has been made on dismantling of private armed groups; the biggest source of violence as the elections approach is targeted assassinations by unidentified gunmen. If some fear that an MILF defeat could lead to a loss in patronage and therefore dangerous discontent among former fighters, the president and his advisers should be helping craft a better-managed reintegration program rather than trying to prop up one side in power.
The report is a snapshot of election preparations as of July 2024. It examines the electoral strength of the parties that have registered to take part in the election, the alliances being formed, the internal rifts, and the ethnic and regional issues involved. And critically, it examines the political interests of key actors in Manila and how these could affect the outcome in BARMM.
&nbsp;

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President Marcos and his advisers should stay neutral on the coming 2025 parliamentary elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).

Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections

<a href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-96-Is-this-the-end-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah-updated.pdf.pdf">IPAC-Report-96-Is-this-the-end-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah-updated</a>

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On 30 June 2024, sixteen senior leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) gathered in Bogor and issued a statement dissolving the organisation.

Is this the end of Jemaah Islamiyah? (Updated)

[Jakarta, 27 June 2024] The Al-Qaeda franchise in Yemen has exerted a small but steady pull on Indonesian jihadis as illustrated by trials that concluded in Jakarta in May 2024.&nbsp;
<a title="Indonesians with al-Qaeda in Yemen" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-95-Indonesians-with-Al-Qaeda-in-Yemen.pdf.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&ldquo;Indonesians with al-Qaeda in Yemen&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), examines a dozen cases of Indonesian extremists who sought training with AQAP from 2012 to 2023. Most departed between 2013 and 2015 with the aim of acquiring military training for a vague future use against Islam&rsquo;s enemies, not for planning terrorist attacks at home.&nbsp;
&nbsp;The attraction of Yemen was in part the belief at the time that the Sunni AQAP would ultimately prevail over both Shi&rsquo;a Houthi and Western-backed leaders.
&ldquo;Belief in the imminent victory of Islamic forces is a powerful pull factor for would-be mujahidin,&rdquo; says Sidney Jones, senior adviser of IPAC. &ldquo;This is something to consider when thinking about the next international battle that Indonesians might be tempted to join.&rdquo;
The recently concluded trials involved six men linked to the organisations Jamaah Ansharul Tauhid (JAT), founded by radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba&rsquo;asyir in 2008, and Jamaah Ansharul Syariah (JAS), a splinter that broke away from JAT after Ba&rsquo;asyir swore loyalty to ISIS in 2014. JAT in East Java was the primary driver of the search for training in Yemen.
While thousands of Indonesians attend schools in Yemen, mostly in the Hadramaut region, neither the traditional Islamic schools there nor the less popular Salafi schools closer to Sana&rsquo;a have been fertile areas for AQAP recruitment. Those known to have sought military training with AQAP were all radicalised at home by groups that viewed al-Qaeda as an ideological ally.
&ldquo;Even if those who went to Yemen did not initially plan to conduct violent attacks in Indonesia, the problem with the skills they learned, from sharpshooting to bomb-making, is that sooner or later, there could be a temptation to use them,&rdquo; says Jones.
&nbsp;

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The Al-Qaeda franchise in Yemen has exerted a small but steady pull on Indonesian jihadis as illustrated by trials that concluded in Jakarta in May 2024.

Indonesians with Al-Qaeda in Yemen

[Jakarta, 3 April 2024] All parties to the peace process in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) need to take steps now to reduce the potential for political violence in the lead-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections.
The latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), <a title="Philippines: Political Jockeying and Violence before the 2025 Elections in BARMM" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-93-Philippines-Political-Jockeying-and-violence-before-the-2025-elections-in-BARMM.pdf.pdf">&ldquo;Philippines: Political Jockeying and Violence before the 2025 Elections in BARMM&rdquo;</a>, analyses the different power blocs that will determine the outcome of the 2025 elections and the political jockeying and alliance-building that has already begun.&nbsp; The stakes are huge. &ldquo;While the peace process itself doesn&rsquo;t hang in the balance,&rdquo; says Sidney Jones, senior adviser to IPAC, &ldquo;the quality of the peace does, and the impact of the 2025 elections will be enormous.&rdquo;
The report explores the mechanics of the elections, the battle to control economic resources, the way in which traditional politicians have moved into king-maker roles, the implications of victory or defeat for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and some of the contentious issues that are raising hackles. These include the gerrymandering undertaken by the MILF leadership in an effort to boost the chances for its party, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), and a probably doomed effort to ban political dynasties. It also looks at why the last phase of &ldquo;normalisation&rdquo; and the decommissioning of MILF fighters has moved so slowly and why it would be in the interest of everyone to speedily complete it.
The 2025 elections for an 80-seat parliament will be the culmination of the peace process that produced the momentous 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. The sources of potential violence, however, are many, from politicians determined to win seats at any cost, disgruntled combatants, a rift in the top ranks of the MILF leadership, and remnants of pro-ISIS groups determined to disrupt democratic procedures.
All parties need to take steps now to prevent deadly conflict. The government needs to map particularly tense areas and assign additional security forces. It also needs to work with civil society and universities to identify and respond to threats and disinformation on social media. Police need to avoid serving arrest warrants on former (and possibly armed) combatants without prior communication with those who can negotiate a peaceful surrender. The MILF needs to get its own house in order. Finally, all local political parties based on the Mindanao mainland need to reach out to the island provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi to ensure their concerns are reflected in programs and Cabinet choices once the elections are over.
&ldquo;Violence can&rsquo;t be eliminated but it can surely be reduced,&rdquo; says Jones. &ldquo;Keeping conflict to a minimum before the elections will help give the new government, once in office, the best chance of living up to the aspirations of those who worked for so long to bring it into being.&rdquo;
&nbsp;

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All parties to the peace process in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) need to take steps now to reduce the potential for political violence in the lead-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections.

Philippines: Political Jockeying and Violence before the 2025 Elections in BARMM